Abstract-Arbitrated signature provides that the signatory signs a message with his private key by quantum cryptography, while the signature receiver verifies the signature with the arbitrator's assistance. In this work, security analysis was given to the arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) and results showed that the receiver Bob and the attacker can forge the signature. Then this paper gives a new quantum one-time pads encryption method, which is suit for the quantum signature. At last, a new AQS protocol using Einstein-Podoisky-Rosen (EPR) pairs is proposed. By using of quantum key distribution (QKD) and new quantum one-time pads, the new scheme can resist Shor's attack. The new scheme has following advantages: (1) The scheme reduces the complexity of implementation and provides a higher efficiency in transmission; (2) Compares with some AQS schemes, the scheme can avoid being disavowed by the receiver; (3) Compares with other AQS schemes, the scheme also guarantees the arbitrator cannot forge the signature and it also ensure the receiver and other attacker cannot forge the signature.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional digital signature can be used to authenticate the identity of the sender of a message by mathematic difficulty problems. The digital signature provides the signatory sign a message or a document with the private key, and the signature receiver can verify the signature is valid or not by the signatory's corresponding public key. Arbitrated signature is a special case of the signature, which provides the signature receiver need the arbitrator's help to verify the signature. Because of impossible of counterfeiting or tampering, digital signature is very important in the modem electronic data processing systems, such as distribution computing and electronic commerce, etc. Until now, almost all the traditional digital signature schemes were based on mathematic difficulty problems, such as the factoring large numbers problem or the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). However, if quantum computers would be invited someday, almost all the traditional digital signature schemes would not be secure, because almost all the public key cryptography can be broken by Shor's algorithm or Fourier algorithm [1] . Fortunately, with the development of the quantum cryptography, the quantum key distribution (QKD) gives us unconditional security. So, many researchers had show increasing interests in quantum signature schemes and some progress has been made on quantum signature schemes.
In 2002, Zeng firstly proposed arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) [2] , in this scheme, both known and unknown quantum states (the message is quantum states) could be signed, and it used the correlation of Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger-GHZ-triplet states (GHZ) and quantum one-time pads to ensure the scheme is security. While, there were some corresponding comments on this scheme [3, 4] . In 2004, Lee proposed two quantum signature schemes with message recovery, in these schemes, the one scheme uses a public board and the other does not, the message which to be signed is traditional binary message [5] . In 2009, Li found the Zeng's scheme [2] , the arbitrator is unnecessary to be entangled and thus the GHZ states used in Ref. [2] can be replaced with Bell states, compared with Zeng's scheme, Li's scheme provided a higher efficiency in transmission and reduced the complexity of implementation [6] . At the same year, Wen proposed a new weak blind signature scheme based on the QKD, it ensures it's security by correlation of EPR pairs [7] . In 2010, Zou showed that in Ref. [2, 6] , the receiver Bob could repudiate he had received the signature, after that, Zou proposed another two arbitrated quantum signature scheme (AQS) schemes, one scheme uses a public board; the other doesn't utilize entangled states in the signing phase and the verifying phase [8] . After that, there were some AQS schemes also be introduced [9] [10] [11] .Very recently, Gao proposed in the previous AQS schemes, the receiver Bob can realize existential forgery of the signatory's signature under known message attack. Bob can even achieve universal forgery when the protocols are used to sign a classical message, and, the signatory Alice can successfully disavow any of her signatures by simple attack [12] .
The secure arbitrated quantum signature protocol must satisfy some conditions: the signature should not be forged by the attacker (include the receiver and the arbitrator Chile), and the other is anyone cannot impossibility of disavowing the signature. In the new scheme, the signatory generates N EPR pairs; one particle of the Bell pair is delivered to the signature receiver, while the other particle is given to the signatory. The signatory measures her particle and signs the message, and then the receiver can verify the signature with the assistance of the arbitrator. Moreover, compare with other AQS scheme [2, 5, 6, 8] , because of encryption key and the transmission key is unequal, so it can ensure the arbitrator cannot forge the signature. The new AQS scheme can guarantee the unconditional secure by using of quantum key distribution and new quantum one-time pads encryption.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, in section Ⅱ, some notations concerning arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) is introduced, in particular, the paper reviews the technique of comparing two unknown quantum states, and the exists quantum one-time pads. Then, in Section Ⅲ , I briefly review of Zou's AQS scheme and show that there are some shortcomings in the scheme, the receiver, Bob, can forge the signature with known message, and the attacker also can forge the signature. Afterwards, in Section Ⅳ, we propose an AQS scheme protocol, which can offer a higher efficiency in transmission and the arbitrator cannot forge the signature. Subsequently, in section Ⅴ , this paper discusses the security of the new AQS scheme. Finally, the remarks and the conclusions are drawn in Section Ⅵ.
II. PRELIMINARY THEORY

A. The Technique for Comparing Two Unknown Quantum States
In AQS verifying phase, the arbitrator Chile and the receiver Bob should verify whether the signatory sign the message correctly or there are some attackers forge the signature, it must use the technique of comparing two unknown quantum states [13] .
Suppose we need to compare two states |ψ > and | φ > are identical whether or not. This needs using the Figure 1 . 
B. Previous Quantum One-time Pad (QOTP)
All the AQS schemes use quantum one-time pad to ensure their security. They use Pauli matrices X δ and Z δ , which denotes X and Z gates. And let 
where i K denotes the ith bit of K, The corresponding
Boykin and Roychowdhury proved that 2N random classical binary bits are both sufficient and necessary for encrypting unknown state of N qubits [14] .
C. Some Notions Concerning AQS Scheme
Similar to previous AQS scheme [2, 5, 6, 8] , in the new AQS scheme, four characters are defined as follows:
(1) Alice: Alice is defined as the signatory, who uses her private key to measures her Bell particle and signs the message.
(2) Bob: Bob is defined as the signature receiver, who receives the signature and verifies the signature with the assistance of the arbitrator.
(3) Charlie: Charlie is defined as the arbitrator, who is trusted by the signatory Alice and the signature receiver Bob; her responsibility is to helping Bob to verify signature.
(4) Eve: The attacker, who wants to forge the signature or replaces Alice to sign the signature.
In the previous Arbitrated quantum signature scheme [2, 6, 8] , the procedure of AQS scheme as follows:
Step 1: First, the signatory Alice got her private key shared with the arbitrator Charlie by BB84 or EPR protocol, and the signature receiver Bob also got his private key shared with Charlie, so the arbitrator Charlie had the Alice's and Bob's private key.
Step 2: Alice combines each message state and the Bell state or the GHZ state, then she measured the entangled state.
Step 3: Alice generated the quantum signature with her private key.
Step 4: Afterward, Alice sent the quantum signature to the receiver Bob through a quantum channel.
Step 5: When the receiver Bob received the quantum signature, he sent the quantum signature to the arbitrator Charlie directly.
Step 6: Subsequently, the arbitrator verified the quantum signature firstly.
Step 7: After that, the arbitrator Charlie sent the quantum signature back to the receiver Bob.
Step 8: Finally, Bob verified the quantum signature. From the procedure of AQS scheme, we can know there are two disadvantages as follows:
(1) In the previous AQS scheme [2, 5, 6, 8] , the arbitrator Chile had the Alice's and Bob's private key, if Chile was a malicious attacker, who could forge any quantum signature, and it could not be detected by anyone.
(2) In Step 4, Alice sent the quantum signature to Bob; and in step 5, Bob sent the signature to Charlie. Because the arbitrator was trusted by Alice and Bob, so Alice is unnecessary to send quantum signature to Bob, it can know if Alice sent the quantum signature to the arbitrator directly in Step 4. Hence it would offer a higher efficiency in transmission than previous scheme [2, 5, 6, 8] .
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF ZOU'S AQS SCHEME [8]
A. Brief Review of Xu's Scheme Step I2:
Alice distributes one particle of EPR pair | ϕ > to Bob with a secure, authenticated method and the other to herself.
(2) Signing phase
Step S1: Alice randomly chooses a number r ∈ 2 {0,1} n and transforms | P > into secret qubit strings
Step Step S3: Alice measures the three-particle entangled state | φ > and gets the measurement | A M > .
Step S4: Alice transfers
(3) Verification phase
Step V1: Bob sends | ( | ' ,| )
the arbitrator Chile.
Step V2: Chile gets (| ' ,| )
Step V3: Chile sends the encrypted results
Step V4: If V =0, Bob rejects the signature; otherwise he recovers | '
Step V5: If | ' B P > = | ' P > , Bob informs Alice by the public board to publish r; otherwise he rejects the signature.
Step V6: Alice publishes r by the public board. Bob gets back | P > from | ' P > by r and holds ( | A S > , r) as Alice's signature for the quantum message | P > .
B. Some Shortcomings of Zou's AQS Scheme
There are some shortcomings in Zou's scheme, similarly, the receiver Bob also can even achieve universal forgery when the protocols are used to sign a classical message [12] , and anyone can successfully forge any of her signatures by simple attack.
(1) Bob's forgery
The key point is whether Bob can find a pair of qubit 
,2 ,2 1
It can see that , ,
We can see that every qubit | |0 |1
is a pure state of a single particle. Therefore, all the minus signs in Eq. (10) are global phases and can be omitted. Hence, we can obtains
Obviously, if Bob provides his forgery signature
Hence, it will always pass the verification. So Bob's forgery method is feasible, and it is in the following:
After step V5, Alice publishes r on the public board. This forge method is very simple and easy to understand. If Chile has the permissions to publish r on the public board, she can forge the signature directly; otherwise, she can forge the signature after Bob send | B Y > to her. So is Chile is a malicious attacker, she could replace Alice to sign the signature.
IV. THE NEW AQS SCHEME
To conquer these shortcomings, first, this paper improve a new quantum one-time pad (QOTP) encryption suitable to the AQS, then proposed an efficient arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) protocol using EinsteinPodoisky-Rosen (EPR) pairs and improved QOTP to ensure the new scheme is security. n . The new QOTP encryption K E on the classic message can be described by
A. The Secure Quantum One-time Pad(QOTP) for the AQS
Here H is the Hadamard transform, which is defined
And S is defined by 1 0
Where † 1 0
| i c > denotes the ith bit of the ciphertext C.
It can see
so the new QOTP will ensure Bob cannot forge the signature. 
B. A New Arbitrated Quantum Signature Protocol using EPR Pairs
shared with the Bob. Because of the signing private key differs from the transmission, so the arbitrator Chile cannot forge the signature.
EPR pairs generation and distribution
For i ∈ {1, …, N}, Alice generates N EPR pairs
Then, for i ∈ {1, …, N}, Alice distributes one particle of EPR pair | i ϕ > to Bob with a secure, authenticated method [19] , the receiver Bob's hand is
and the other to herself.
Signing phase
Step S1: The signatory Alice generates four copies of
β > (one to produce the secret qubit string | P > with Alice's signing private key, one to be sent to Bob to generate | ' b P > , one to be combined with the EPR pair, one to encrypts by Alice's signing private key).
Step 
This encrypted method is safe, and anyone cannot decrypt | P > without the cipher text m' and the signing private key A K .
Step S4: For i ∈ {1, …, N}, Alice obtains the three- 
The |ψ
four Bell states [20] , which is defined as follows:
Step S5: For i ∈ {1, …, N}, the signatory Alice measures the three-particle entangled state Step S8: Alice sends her signature | S > to the arbitrator Chile and sends the quantum string | C > to Bob through a quantum channel.
Verification phase
Step V1: The arbitrator Chile decrypts | S > with Alice's signing private key A K , and gets (| , ) P R > .
Then he copies R.
Step V2: Chile generates 
Step V4: Bob recovers | '
N f > } from the three-particle entangled state | B > as Eq. (20) and Alice's measurement A. The recovered method is as follows: 
Step V5: he compares two quantum states | ' F > , | F > with the approach in Ref. [13] . If | '
he rejects the signature.
Step Step V7: Bob informs Alice to publish r, and Alice publishes r by the public board.
Step V8: Bob recovers m= 
V. SECURITY AND ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A secure signature scheme should have the following characteristics: (1) Impossibility of forgery. The attackers (include the receiver, the signatory and the arbitrator) cannot forge the signature. (2) Impossibility of disavowal. The signatory Alice cannot disavow that she has signed the signature, and the receiver cannot refuse that he has received the signature.
A. Impossibility of Forgery
Suppose the attacker Eve wants to substitute Alice to sign the message, and then Eve sends the quantum signature | S > to the arbitrator. Because the BB84 or EPR protocol is unconditional secure, Eve cannot get the Alice's secret key A K , so she cannot encrypt | S > with A K . Therefore, it will be detected by the arbitrator by decrypting | S > . Similarly, if Eve gets the quantum signature | S > , she also cannot decrypt | S > and cannot get any information of the ( | P > , | T > ,R). Hence Eve cannot forge the signature | S > . Similarly, Eve cannot forge | B S > .
Suppose the receiver Bob is a malicious attacker, who wants to replace Alice to sign the message favorable to him. The scheme also can resist the receiver Bob forging signature. Suppose Bob forges another quantum signature 
B. Impossibility of Disavowal
Zou found that there were some existing AQS schemes [2, 6] can be repudiated by the receiver Bob [8] . Compare with those AQS schemes [2, 6] , the new scheme ensure the receiver cannot disavow the signature by adding the signature parameter r.
Because 
C. Comparison with Other Quantum Signature Scheme
Because the signatory Alice sends the signature | S > to the arbitrator directly; it is also can offer a higher efficiency in transmission. Compare with [2, 5, 6] , the proposed scheme is more efficient in transmission, as stated in Table 1 . 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper explores some shortcomings in the previous AQS scheme, because the arbitrator has Alice's and Bob's private key, so if the arbitrator is dishonest, he can forge the signature. And the quantum one-time pad is not suit for the quantum signature, so Bob can forge the signature by this shortcoming. Then, the paper proposes a new efficient arbitrated quantum signature protocol using EPR pairs and improved QOTP. In this scheme, it not only maintains the advantages of the original scheme but also offers a higher efficiency in transmission, and also ensures the arbitrator cannot forge the signature.
